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CEMETERY LAND USE AND
THE URBAN PLANNER
JOSEPH D. LEHRER*
Cemeteries pose a special problem to the urban practitioner be-
cause of the traditionally favored position which land used for burials
has held. Burial practices have largely been determined by supersti-
tion, religion and a regard for sanitation and health., Thus, from
the pyramids of Egypt through the churchyards of Europe to the
modem memorial parks, civilizations have given cemeteries special
protection.2
Although the separation of church and state has theoretically
secularized the law of burial in the United States, religious custom
has been recognized by the courts.3 As the courts struggle to find a
legal rationale for spiritual concerns," the urban planner is faced
with the problem of finding sufficient land to be permanently allo-
cated for the use of sepulture which will meet the moral and legal
prescriptions of society. 5
This Note will focus on the legal principles with which the urban
practitioner must work. The problems can be divided into two cate-
* A.B., Washington University, 1970; J.D., Washington University, 1973.
1. P. JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVERS 10-14 (2d ed. 1950) [hereinafter
cited as JACKSON].
2. Id. at 10-20.
3. One state supreme court has said:
The sepulture of the dead has, in all ages of the world, been regarded as a
religious rite. The place where the dead are deposited all civilized nations,
and many barbarous ones, regard, in some measure at least, as consecrated
ground. In old Saxon tongue the burial ground of the dead was "God's acre."
Dwenger v. Geary, 113 Ind. 106, 112, 14 N.E. 903, 907 (1888). See also Chop-
pin v. Dauphin, 48 La. Ann. 1217, 20 So. 681 (1896).
4. Much of this struggle stems from the difficulty that American colonial
courts experienced when they chose to discard the ecclesiastical church law,
since the law of sepulture judges had attempted to integrate the spiritual cus-
toms of society into the common law rules of real property and contracts. See
JACKSON 25-28.
5. W. GOODMAN, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF URBAN PLANNING 231-32
(4th ed. 1968); AMERICAN SoCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, PLANNING ADvi-
SORY SERVICE REPORT No. 16, CEMETERIES IN THE CITY PLAN 1 (July, 1950)
[hereinafter cited as ASPO REPORT].
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gories: where and how to locate proposed cemeteries; and how to
deal with pre-existing cemeteries in an urban area.
I. LoCATION OF PROPOSED CEMETERIES
It is estimated that cemeteries occupy nearly two million acres of
land in the United States.6 The problem, however, is not the amount
of land being used for burials, but rather that much of this land is
choice urban property.7 The possibility of the dead overcrowding the
living was recognized as far back as 1821.8 Although the problem of
cemetery land use did not receive due recognition in this country
until much later,9 the use of land for cemetery purposes has now
become a publicized concern for urban planners.1°
A primary consideration in cemetery land use is that cemeteries
must be located within easy commuting distance of population cen-
ters-a necessity which the courts have protected.' Thus, as an urban
area grows, it will engulf cemetery lands which were originally estab-
lished on the quiet outskirts of the city.
Another important consideration in the location of cemeteries is
its relative permanence.' 2 Consequently, the planner is forced to plan
much further into the future.
6. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, CEMETERIES AS OPEN
SPACE RESERVATIONS 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as HUD REPORT].
7. ASPO REPORT 2.
8. See Gilbert v. Buzzard, 161 Eng. Rep. 1342 (Consistory Ct. of London
1820):
A comparatively small portion of the dead will shoulder out the living and
their posterity. The whole environs of this metropolis must be surrounded
by a circumvallation of church yards, perpetually enlarging by becoming
themselves surcharged with bodies; if indeed land owners can be found will-
ing to direct their ground from the beneficial uses of the living to the barren
preservation of the dead.
Id. at 1350.
9. As recently as 1950 a prominent legal authority on the subject said, "The
compelling reason that the dead might crowd out the living does not exist here."
JACKSON 357-58.
10. ASPO REPORT 1-2; Grave Squeeze, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 16, 1968, at 94.
11. "Burial places are indispensable. Convenient to the city of the living, a
depository of the dead must be established and maintained." Town of Lake View
v. Rose Hill Cemetery Co., 70 Ill. 191, 195, 22 Am. R. 71, 74 (1873). See also
Hertle v. Riddle, 127 Ky. 623, 629, 106 S.W. 282, 284 (1907). For the propo-
sition that burial places are not subject to absolute prohibition see notes 29-30
and accompanying text infra.
12. For the proposition that society and the courts are reluctant to move
dead bodies once they are buried see notes 88-97 and accompanying text infra.
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In planning for cemeteries it must be recognized that not only
will a considerable area of land be used for the purpose, but that
it will be probably so used in perpetuity, for once reserved,
burial grounds are rarely moved both to the practical and to the
legal difficulties involved.13
A. General Principles of Regulation
The location and use of lands devoted to cemeteries are subject to
the state or local police power.14 Although the traditional justifica-
tion for the use of police power over the location of cemeteries is
the conservation of public health,"- some courts have looked at other
considerations of public welfare." At least one court has extended
the meaning of public welfare and found that regulation of cem-
eteries with a view toward promoting the economic prosperity of a
city was a valid use of the police power.'7 As Justice Holmes sug-
gested, however, the source of local authority to regulate cemeteries
is not necessarily dependent upon public welfare principles; the
power may be constitutional merely as being traditionally inherent
in local government.'$
[T]he extent to which legislation may modify and restrict the
uses of property consistently with the Constitution is not a ques-
tion for pure abstract theory alone. Tradition and habits of the
community count for more than logic. Since, as before the mak-
ing of the constitutions, regulations of burial and prohibition of
it in certain spots, especially in crowded cities, have been familiar
to the Western 1\Vorld."9
13. W. GOODsAN, supra note 5, at 231.
14. Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City & County of San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358
(1910); Faulk v. Buena Vista Burial Park Ass'n, 152 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941). Cemeteries have always been subject to regulation. In ancient cultures
there is evidence of segregated burial places and restrictions enforced by taboos.
Subsequent control by the church regulated cemetery location until the doctrine
of separation of church from state became prevalent. Thus, regulation of burial
has always been deemed a proper subject of habitual or legislative regulation.
See JACKSON 187-88.
15. Bryan v. City of Birmingham, 154 Ala. 447, 45 So. 922 (1908); Killian
v. Brith Sholom Congregation, 154 S.W.2d 387 (Mo. App. 1941); Moritz v.
United Brethrens Church, 269 N.Y. 125, 199 N.E. 29 (1935).
16. See, e.g., Mensi v. Walker, 160 Tenn. 468, 26 S.W.2d 132 (1930), appeal
dismiised, 283 U.S. 791 (1931) (use of police power in the location of cemeteries
was valid in relation to streets and highways).
17. Beth Hamedrosh Anshe Calicia Congregation v. Village of Brooklyn, 44
Ohio L. Abs. 522, 65 N.E.2d 298 (Ct. App. 1945).
18. See cases cited note 15 supra.
19. Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City & County of San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358,
366 (1910).
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The use of the police power to regulate cemeteries may be directly
exercised by the state20 or delegated to local authorities.21 A distinc-
tion between general and specific grants of legislative power by the
state to the municipalities is made by the courts, however, when deal-
ing with the validity of an ordinance regulating cemeteries. When
an ordinance is passed pursuant to the express grant of police power
to a municipality, the ordinance is regarded as an act of the state
legislature and cannot be invalidated by the courts as being unrea-
sonable because the legislative determination of what is reasonable
cannot be pre-empted by a judicial determination. 22 Thus, the only
way to invalidate an ordinance passed under a specific grant of auth-
ority by the state is either to find that the delegation is a violation
of the state constitution 23 or that federal constitutional rights have
been invaded.24 On the other hand, an ordinance regulating the
location of cemeteries under a general grant of the police power to a
municipality will be invalidated if the court finds that such an ordi-
nance is not a reasonable use of the delegated power because the
question of whether any ordinance is within the power delegated
is for judicial determination.25
B. Prohibition
Prohibition of cemeteries within the city limits is not recom-
mended by urban planners. They reason that since cemeteries appear
to be a cultural necessity they will locate in areas just outside the
city limits.26 As the city grows, those cemeteries which have been
20. E.g., Moritz v. United Brethrens Church, 269 N.Y. 125, 199 N.E. 29(1935); Faulk v. Buena Vista Burial Park Ass'n, 152 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941).
21. E.g., Carpenter v. Borough of Yeadon, 151 F. 879 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1907);
Odd Fellows' Cemetery Ass'n v. City & County of San Francisco, 140 Cal. 226,
73 P. 987 (1903).
22. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Borough of Yeadon, 151 F. 879 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1907); Catholic Bishop v. Village of Palos Park, 286 Ill. 400, 121 N.E. 561
(1918).
23. Catholic Bishop v. Village of Palos Park, 286 Ill. 400, 121 N.E. 561(1918).
24. In re Smith, 143 Cal. 368, 77 P. 180 (1904); Park Hill Dev. v. City of
Evansville, 190 Ind. 432, 130 N.E. 645 (1921).
25. Carpenter v. Borough of Yeadon, 151 F. 879 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1907); Alosi
v. Jones, 234 Ala. 391, 174 So. 774 (1937); Killian v. Brith Sholom Congrega-
tion, 154 S.W.2d 387 (Mo. App. 1941).
26. ASPO REPoRT 15.
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arbitrarily placed outside the city limits, devoid of municipal regula-
tion, will impede future municipal growth.
The use of negative control of location, however, is limited
in value. "Outside the city limits" is no answer if the planning
is for a county, for a metropolitan area, or for a region. It is a
shortsighted solution for even those who are only concerned with
the area within the city corporate boundary lines. Many cities
may be expected to grow and annex additional land. In the
future, these cities may be faced with annexing a previously
banned cemetery, or the logical direction of city growth may be
thwarted by the presence of the cemetery."
The prospect of absolutely prohibiting interments must, however,
be a tempting prospect for a city. The most recurring complaint is
that the customary tax-exempt status of cemeteries causes financial
hardships upon city government.2 8 New York City is on the brink of
fiscal crisis resulting in part from land depletion-nearly one-third
of its property is tax exempt.2 9 At least one court has ruled that such
fiscal considerations sufficiently concern the public welfare to enable
the municipality to pass an ordinance prohibiting future burials. -0
Furthermore, unless properly assimilated into the regional master
plan, a cemetery may impede the logical pattern of future growth of
the area.31
Many courts have held that a city may not absolutely prohibit
cemeteries. 32 The courts' primary objection to prohibition occurs
where there is sufficient open space and no apparent nuisance or
impediment to the city.
27. Id.
28. The public necessity, quasi-public character and the traditional exemption
enjoyed by churches has led to a general underlying policy of exemption from
taxation and assessment. See JACxSON 267-81.
29. HUD Rnoa'r 38.
30. Where 7% of the village's total area was devoted towards tax-exempt
cemeteries, an ordinance prohibiting future burials was valid in order to secure
the right economic conditions. Beth Hamedrosh Anshe Calicia Congregation v.
Village of Brooklyn, 44 Ohio L. Abs. 522, 65 N.E.2d 298 (Ct. App. 1945).
31. ASPO REPORT 15-16.
32. E.g., City of Park Ridge v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 4 Ill. 2d
144, 122 N.E.2d 265 (1954); Village of Villa Park v. Wanderer's Rest Cem-
etery Co., 316 Ill. 226, 147 N.E. 104 (1925); Town of Lake View v. Rose Hill
Cemetery Co., 70 Il. 191, 22 Am. R. 71 (1873); Faulk v. Buena Vista Burial
Park Ass'n, 152 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
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Where the place in which it is proposed to bury the dead is
remote from human habitations, or is close to but a few dwell-
ings, the absolute prohibition of interments is an unreasonable
restriction of a lawful business, not fairly justified or required
for the preservation of the public health, and will not be sus-
tained by the courts.3
It is generally accepted, however, that a city may prohibit ceme-
teries within its boundaries if the city is densely populated.3' Further-
more, statutes prohibiting burials within short distances of a densely
populated city's boundaries have been held valid.35 Some statutes
have been passed which make it compulsory for a cemetery to get
the approval of a local authority before the cemetery is established.80
As a result, while not totally prohibiting cemeteries, courts and legis-
latures have subjected their location to careful scrutiny.
C. Zoning
As opposed to prohibition of cemeteries, zoning implies planned
location in accordance with surrounding land use, the master plan,
and the future logical growth of the dty.37 In general, cemeteries
should be located in residential zones. 38 While there may be some
reluctance to residing near a cemetery, the emotional attitude of the
public is against placing them in or near commercial and industrial
development.39 At least one court has, however, declared a cemetery
a commercial use.40
Many zoning ordinances allow religious functions as exceptions to
33. Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City & County of San Francisco, 152 Cal. 464,
93 P. 70 (1907), aff'd, 216 U.S. 358 (1910). See also Hume v. Laurel Hill
Cemetery, 142 F. 552 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1905) (ordinance which prohibited burials
in entire county embracing large amounts of unoccupied land was found unreason-
able use of police power).
34. Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City & County of San Francisco, 152 Cal. 464,
93 P. 70 (1907), aff'd, 216 U.S. 358 (1910).
35. See Franklin v. Pietzsch, 334 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
36. E.g., Gordon v. Commissioners of Montgomery County, 164 Md. 210, 164
A. 676 (1933); Wojtkowiak v. Evangelical Lutheran St. Johns Church, 142
Misc. 264, 255 N.Y.S. 180 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
37. Zoning ordinances have been found to be a constitutional means of regu-
lating cemeteries. Shumeker v. Dalton, 51 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
38. ASPO R:EPORT 17.
39. Id.
40. North Side Property Owners Ass'n v. Hillside Memorial Park, 70 Cal. App.
2d 609, 161 P.2d 618 (1945).
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the restrictive uses of residential districts. This has caused a problem
where a cemetery operated by a religious organization has claimed
an exception to the ordinance as a religious use. In Appeal of Rus-
sian Orthodox Church-' the court held that a cemetery was not a
"religious use" as that term was used in an ordinance allowing such
uses in residential or agricultural districts. 42
Another problem associated with zoning of cemeteries is the pos-
sibility that cases upholding ordinances prohibiting mortuaries in
residential districts because of their psychological and depressive
effect on the neighborhood43 may be applied by analogy to ceme-
teries. Although no court has ruled directly on that issue, the court
in Russian Orthodox in upholding the exclusion of a cemetery from
a residential district rejected the notion "'that the men who drew
up this zoning ordinance meant that a beautiful home should have
a cemetery next door .... '"" Thus, courts may show sympathy to
residential neighbors of a cemetery. It is doubtful, however, that
courts would exhibit similar sympathy for a person whose residence
was adjacent to any other open space use, such as a park.
D. Condemnation of Lands for Cemetery Use
Because of the broad powers of eminent domain inherent in local
government, land acquisition for cemetery purposes is rarely a prob-
lem. The two requirements for condemnation of land for burial pur-
poses are a delegation of condemnation power by the state legislature
and the use of the condemned lands for public purpose.4 5
The burial of the dead in a place designated for that purpose and
in which any member of the community may acquire burial rights is
considered a public use. Land to be used for such purpose may be
acquired by eminent domain. 46 Accordingly, the general public
41. 397 Pa. 126, 152 A.2d 489 (1959).
42. For definitions of the term "religious uses" in regards to residential zoning
districts see E. YOKLMY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE 180 (3d ed. 1967) and
cases cited therein.
43. See, e.g., Jack v. Tourant, 136 Conn. 414, 71 A.2d 705 (1950); Arthur
v. Virkler, 144 Misc. 483, 258 N.Y.S. 886 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
44. 397 Pa. at 131, 152 A.2d at 492 (dissenting opinion).
45. See generally JACKsoN 233-35.
46. See, e.g., People v. Forrest Home Cemetery Co., 258 Ill. 36, 101 N.E.
219 (1913); Peru Cemetery Co. v. Mount Hope Cemetery, 224 Ind. 202, 65
N.E.2d 844 (1946); City of Caruthersville v. Faris, 237 Mo. App. 605, 146
S.W.2d 80 (1940).
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
must have the right of burial in the cemetery,47 but the use will not
cease to be public merely because there is a varying charge for lots
in different parts of the cemetery, thereby excluding all but the
wealthy from certain portions of the cemetery land.48
Where the power to condemn land for cemetery purposes has been
expressly delegated to a municipal corporation, the courts will not
question the necessity of the exercise of such power, in absence of the
abuse of the right.49 Consequently, it will look to the particular site
chosen,50 or the amount of land being taken.51 There is some ques-
tion, however, whether a municipality can condemn lands for burial
use through a general delegation of authority under eminent
domain.52
The authority to condemn lands for cemetery use may be delegated
to a private corporation.5 3 Thus, if a private cemetery can meet the
requirements of public use, it could be vested with eminent do-
main power by the legislature.5 4 If the cemetery, however, exerts
excessive control over the conditions for burial, or discriminates in
any way to make burial exclusive to any particular class, it will lose
its public character and cannot be endowed with eminent domain
power. 5
II. CONTROL OF PRE-EXISTING CEMETERIES
A problem of the urban planner which is perhaps even more
troublesome than the location of proposed cemeteries is how to deal
with pre-existing cemeteries. Older cemeteries were built on sites
which were, at that time, on the outskirts of the metropolitan area,
47. E.g., Evergreen Cemetery Ass'n v. Beecher, 53 Conn. 551, 5 A. 353 (1886).
48. Id.
49. E.g., City of Winchester v. Ring, 312 Ill. 544, 144 N.E. 333 (1924).
50. Crowell v. Londonderry, 63 N.H. 42 (1884).
51. City of Winchester v. Ring, 312 Ill. 544, 144 N.E. 333 (1924) (not an
abuse of discretion for municipality of 1,800 residences to condemn 12 acres
for cemetery use).
52. Where an express grant is not given, the municipality may not condemn
lands for cemetery use. E.g., Town of Eaton v. Bouslog, 133 Colo. 130, 292 P.
2d 343 (1956). Contra, City of Caruthersville v. Faris, 237 Mo. App. 605, 146
S.W.2d 80 (1940).
53. See cases cited note 46 supra.
54. See cases cited note 46 supra.




but now are within the inner core of the city. As land development
continues, cemeteries, as open space within a developing area, in-
crease in value for commercial and residential use. Furthermore,
there is a premium on usable open space within the inner city to
counterbalance the dehumanizing effects of high density land cover-
age.rG
To accentuate the problem of pre-existing cemeteries even further,
many of these cemeteries have been poorly maintained or aban-
doned57 Poorly maintained and crowded cemeteries, like other neg-
lected and crowded land uses, also depress the surrounding neigh-
borhood.;5
A. Cemeteries as a Nuisance
One means of controlling a pre-existing cemetery is to have it des-
ignated a nuisance. As a general rule, a cemetery is not a nuisance
per se. 1 Consequently, in order to have land devoted to burials de-
clared a nuisance the complainant must prove that it is a nuisance
in fact,60 or that it fails to meet some statutory requirement. 61 If de-
clared a nuisance by a court of equity, the cemetery may be ordered
to discontinue operations.62
Whether a cemetery constitutes a nuisance in fact will depend
56. HUD REPORT 4.
57. Id. at 3.
58. ASPO REPORT 6. The report also comments that:[Ejxisting cemeteries become problems when they fall into dis-use, when
their care is neglected, when the land is needed for another use, when they
lie in the path of some needed public improvement. The old cemetery may
become a health hazard. Even when it is carefully maintained, many persons
feel that a cemetery in a neighborhood will depress property values. Munic-
ipal administrators dislike cemeteries because they are part of the ever in-
creasing list of tax-exempt properties.
Id. at 4.
59. See, e.g., Hume v. Laurel Hill Cemetery, 142 F. 552 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1905);
Morton v. St. Patrick's Roman Catholic Church Soc'y, 56 Misc. 71, 105 N.Y.S.
1100 (Sup. Ct. 1907); Mensi v. Walker, 160 Tenn. 468, 26 S.W.2d 132 (1930),
appeal dismissed, 283 U.S. 791 (1931).
60. E.g., Symmonds v. Novelty Cemetery Ass'n, 21 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. App.
1929); Board of Health v. Lewis, 196 N.C. 641, 146 S.E. 592 (1929).
61. Magler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); People v. New York Edison Co.,
159 App. Div. 786, 144 N.Y.S. 707 (1913).
62. JACKsON 210-11. The burden of proof, however, is on the complainant and
the burden is often onerous. See Comment, Cemetery Abandonment and Dis-
interment of Human Remains, 35 ALBANY L. REv. 320, 323 (1971).
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upon its own particular circumstances.6 3 The complaint may be
brought by public authorities 64 or by an injured private party.05 The
majority of cases in which the courts have found that a cemetery
constituted a nuisance usually involved an intrusion of odor or
pollutants into the surrounding air or water supplies, to the detri-
ment of public health."6 On the other hand, since a cemetery is not
a nuisance per se, it is not a nuisance merely because it might be-
come one in the future-r due to its presence depreciating the sur-
rounding land values68 or its proximity to neighboring residential
areas.6 9 Courts have also rejected claims of future nuisance based on
probable traffic congestion,0 a large number of pre-existing ceme-
teries in the community,71 or objections for purely aesthetic rea-
sons.72 Since courts have found, however, that mortuaries can be en-
joined as a nuisance in a residential area, a minority of cases have
found that the depressing effects of a cemetery in a residential district
may cause the cemetery to be regarded as a nuisance in fact.73
63. Hume v. Laurel Hill Cemetery, 142 F. 552 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1905);
Normandy Consol. School Dist. v. Harral, 315 Mo. 602, 286 S.W. 86 (1926);
Morton v. St. Patrick's Roman Catholic Church Soc'y, 56 Misc. 71, 105 N.Y.S.
1100 (Sup. Ct. 1907).
64. Village of Villa Park v. Wanderer's Rest Cemetery, 316 Ii. 226, 147 N.E.
104 (1925).
65. Sutton v. Findley Cemetery Ass'n, 270 Ill. 11, 110 N.E. 315 (1915).
66. Union Cemetery Co. v. Harrison, 20 Ala. App. 291, 101 So. 517 (1924)
(noxious and disagreeable odors); Payne v. Wayland, 131 Iowa 659, 109 N.W.
203 (1906) (proximity to town's water supply). The plaintiff must show proof
of probable injury. Braasch v. Cemetery Ass'n of the Evangelical Lutheran Christ
Soc'y, 69 Neb. 300, 95 N.W. 646 (1903).
67. Village of Villa Park v. Wanderer's Rest Cemetery, 316 I1. 226, 147 N.E.
104 (1925).
68. Hume v. Laurel Hill Cemetery, 142 F. 552 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1905);
Normandy Consol. School Dist. v. Harral, 315 Mo. 602, 286 S.W. 86 (1926).
69. Braasch v. Cemetery Ass'n of the Evangelical Lutheran Christ Soc'y, 69
Neb. 300, 95 N.W. 646 (1903). One court, however, seemed to emphasize that
the cemetery was in a lower-class residential zone. Antenucci v. Hartford Roman
Catholic Diocesan Corp., 19 Conn. Supp. 131, 110 A.2d 495 (Super. Ct. 1954).
70. McCaw v. Harrison, 259 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1953).
71. Normandy Consol. School Dist. v. Harral, 315 Mo. 602, 286 S.W. 86
(1926).
72. Village of Villa Park v. Wanderer's Rest Cemetery Co., 316 11. 226, 147
N.E. 104 (1925); Jones v. Highland Memorial Park, 242 S.W.2d 250 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1951).
73. Jones v. Trawick, 75 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1959); Overby v. Piet, 163 So.
2d 532 (Fla. App. 1964). But cf. Young v. St. Martin's Church, 361 Pa. 505,
64 A.2d 814 (1949) (expressly rejecting the analogy between funeral homes
and mortuaries and cemeteries).
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Although a cemetery may not be a nuisance in fact, it may be held
to be one in law.74 Since a statute may define what constitutes a
nuisance,75 a cemetery may be declared a nuisance,78 and a statute
may prescribe a mode of conduct of a cemetery which, when violated,
will also cause a determination of a nuisance.77
As a practical matter, nuisance law is ineffectual in controlling pre-
existing cemeteries because of the heavy burden of proof, the neces-
sity of showing probable injury, and the political difficulty of per-
suading the state legislature to act.78
B. Eminent Domain
Another method for solving the urban planner's dilemma regard-
ing the pre-existing cemetery is use of the government's eminent
domain power.7 9 There is no doubt that the legislature has the power
to take lands devoted to burial purposes by condemnation,80 but if
the cemetery is public, the lands may not be taken by a municipal
government without an express delegation of power from the state
legislature.18 Also, at least one state statute provides for immunity
from municipal condemnation even for private cemeteries.
8 2
Even where exercise of the eminent domain power is not hampered
by a lack of express legislative authorization, there are often other
obstacles encountered in the condemnation procedure. Courts will
not make a presumption of the necessity of taking a particular piece
of land and will often determine whether a necessity exists by balanc-
74. JACKSON 209-10.
75. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
76. Campbell v. Kansas City, 102 Mo. 339, 13 S.W. 897 (1890). But such
a determination cannot be made by a municipality without evidence of a nui-
sance in fact. Rosehill Cemetery Co. v. City of Chicago, 352 Ill. 11, 185 N.E.
170 (1933); City of St. Joseph v. Georgetown Lodge, 222 Mo. App. 1076, 11
S.W.2d 1082 (1928).
77. Furstenberg v. Brissey, 28 Okla. 591, 115 P. 465 (1910).
78. See Cemetery Abandonment and Disinterment of Human Remains, supra
note 62, at 322-24.
79. ASPO REPORT 5.
80. In re Board of Street Openings, 133 N.Y. 329, 31 N.E. 102 (1892).
81. Eden Memorial Park Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 189 Cal. App. 2d 421, 11
Cal. Rptr. 189 (1961). Contra, City of New Orleans v. Christ Church Corp.,
228 La. 184, 81 So. 2d 855 (1955). See also Evergreen Cemetery Ass'n v. City of
New Haven, 43 Conn. 234, 21 Am. R. 643 (1875); In re New York, L. & W.
Ry., 99 N.Y. 12, 1 N.E. 27 (1885).
82. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 1401(k) (McKinney 1970).
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ing the interests in maintaining the status quo (retaining the ceme-
tery) against the convenience of taking that particular land by the
government.8 3 This is further tempered by the fact that some statutes
require that before cemetery lands are put to other uses, there must
be a proper disinterment and re-interment of the remains,84 and courts
are reluctant to disturb the repose of the deceased.80
The result of all this is that even the state's absolute right to
appropriate property for a public purpose is, in practice, some-
what less than absolute, when applied to cemeteries. Government
planners are forced to try every feasible alternative before at-
tempting to take cemetery land, rather than face the uncertainties
of eminent domain proceedings in that area. Thus, land which
might be better devoted to another use often becomes the bed of
a new highway because it is not protected by the special treat-
ment afforded the nearby cemetery.8 6
Some relief is given by the courts, however, when the cemetery is
abandoned or in disrepair. 7 As one court stated when faced with a
condemnation suit for an old cemetery:
We certainly cannot be sure that the lawmakers, if they had
known of this cemetery, disused for burials for 50 years, and
never more to be used for that purpose, located in the midst of
a dense and teeming population, would have preferred that it
should remain appropriated for the resting place of the long
since dead, rather than that it should be devoted to use for the
comfort, welfare, and health of the living. We cannot say that
the taking of such a cemetery for such a use is such an unreason-
able, unnatural, impolitic, or unjust thing .... 88
83. See, e.g., In re Board of Street Openings, 133 N.Y. 329, 31 N.E. 102
(1892).
84. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 7900 (Deering 1961);
Micr. STAT. ANN. § 5.3074 (1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:60-25.33 et seq.
(1967) (providing an elaborate system for public acquisition of old cemeteries
and disinterment of bodies); N.Y. MEMB. CORPS. LAW § 81 (McKinney 1941);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1721.01 (Page 1964) (limiting eminent domain to
lands not containing graves); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2, 43 (1965).
85. JACKSON 405.
86. Cemetery Abandonment and Disinterment of Human Remains, supra
note 62, at 324-25.
87. JACKSON 405.





The most prominent obstacle in the path of the urban planner who
wishes to convert a cemetery to another use is society's reluctance
to move a cadaver once it is buried. Whether it is practical or not,
disinterment is required whenever a cemetery is abandoned.89
There is a deep historical basis for society's abhorrence of disinter-
mentY0 In ancient Rome, a body, once buried, could be removed
only with the rarely granted permission of the governor.91 Early
Danish law condemned to death any person found guilty of disturb-
ing the dead, and the felon's body was "to lie forever unburied and
unhonored." - English common law held that disinterment was a
misdemeanor even if done for a laudable or pious purpose.93 A note-
worthy display of the abhorrence of moving buried bodies was made
by Shakespeare, who could easily bring himself to joke about the dis-
interment of "alas poor Yorick," but in regards to his own remains,
had his epitaph read:
Good friend for Jesus' sake
forbear
To dig the dust enclosed
here;
Blest be the man that spares
these stones,
And cursed be he that moves
my bones.
European countries, faced with critical land shortages, eventually
changed their views on disinterment. In England, the purchase right
to interment customarily remained so long as it took the body to
decompose.2 Similarly, in France and other Latin countries, the
burial lot is often rented out, and when there is no one available to
89. N.Y. NOT-FoR-PRoFIT CORP. LAW § 1401 (r) (McKinney 1970); JACKSON
402.
90. JACKSON 101-05.
91. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swanpoint Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 235-36 (1872).
92. REPORT OF RUGOLES, LAW OF BURIAL, 4 Brad. Surr. 503, 525 (N.Y. 1857)
(Appendix).
93. Thompson v. Hickey, 8 Abb. N. Cas. 159, 168, 59 How. Pr. 434, 438
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1880).
94. See Wilson v. Read, 74 N.H. 322, 68 A. 37 (1907). See also Gilbert v.
Buzzard, 161 Eng. Rep. 1342 (Consistory Ct. of London 1820) (court disallowed
burial in iron coffin since the owner of lot purchased only a right to normal
dissolution which would be delayed by the metallic coffin).
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continue the payments, the bones are dug up and thrown into a comer
of the cemetery.9 In the United States, possibly because of the easy
availability of lands, there developed a presumption of a perpetual
right to remain interred in one lot.9 The grave was held to be not
only the domus ultima, but the domus aeterna.97
The strict common law rule that all disinterments were illegal was
later altered in this country, but only slightly. Judge Cardozo, speak-
ing for the Court of Appeals of New York stated the rule: "The dead
are to rest where they have been laid unless reason of substance is
brought forward for disturbing their repose."98 Thus, a court will
allow disinterment only in cases of extreme exigency, which almost
never occur in civil actions.99 Nevertheless, it is clear that the state
legislature is empowered to order the removal of bodies from a ceme-
tery by exercise of its police power10o Thus, in a leading disinter-
ment case, Kincaid's Appeal,101 the court found that a special statute
which, after reciting the necessity of removal because of the neglected
condition of the cemetery, provided for disinterment, was a constitu-
tional use of police power not necessitating compensation to the
relatives of the deceased.102 The constitutional basis for such statutes
is that the purchaser of a cemetery lot does not acquire an estate in
fee;103 all he purchases is a mere right of burial, subject to proper
regulation under the police power.104 Thus, a statute which orders
95. JAcxsoN 358.
96. Wilson v. Read, 74 N.H. 322, 68 A. 37 (1907).
97. Brendle v. German Reformed Congregation, 33 Pa. 415 (1859) (not only
the last home, but the eternal home).
98. Yome v. Gorman, 242 N.Y. 395, 403, 152 N.E. 126, 129 (1926).
99. See German Evangelical St. Marcus Congregation v. Archanbault, 383
S.W.2d 704 (Mo. 1964) (court would not allow abandonment and disinterment
of remains in order to relieve insolvency of religious cemetery corporation). See
also Cemetery Abandonment and Disinterment of Human Remains, supra note
62; Note, Moving Cemeteries to Build Low-Income Housing-A Violation of the
"Right to Rest in Peace?", 6 VAL. U.L. Rav. 96, 99-101 (1971).
100. E.g., Masonic Cemetery Ass'n v. Gamage, 38 F.2d 950 (9th Cir. 1930);
Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Pa. 411 (1870). See Annot., 71 A.L.R. 1040 (1931).
101. 66 Pa. 411 (1870).
102. Id.
103. Masonic Cemetery Ass'n v. Gamage, 38 F.2d 950 (9th Cir. 1930); Holly-
wood Cemetery Ass'n v. Posell, 210 Cal. 121, 291 P. 397 (1930); Scale v. Ma-
sonic Cemetery Ass'n, 217 Cal. 286, 18 P.2d 667 (1933); Note, The Cemetery
Lot: Rights and Restrictions, 109 U. PA. L. R-v. 378 (1961).
104. The Cemetery Lot: Rights and Restrictions, supra note 103.
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a cemetery to be abandoned is not a taking without just compensa-
tion to the owners of the lots, since they are losing no property
right.105
Another constitutional issue involved with compulsory disinter-
ment by statute is whether the deceased has any constitutional rights
which have been violated. Do the dead have a right to privacy which
prohibits their being disturbed in their repose?106 At least one early
court recognized that the dead have rights which must be protected:
The sentiments and feeling which people in a Christian State
have for the dead, the law regards and respects, and however it
may have been anterior to our legislation on the subject of cem-
eteries, the dead themselves have rights, which are committed
to the living to protect, and in doing which they obtain security
for the undisturbed rest of their own remains.107
More recent cases, however, have rejected the notion that the rights
of a person continue after death.10 8 The reason for rejecting the con-
stitutional rights of the dead is that the "[d]ecedent's rights, being
personal, could not survive.., death and cannot validly be urged
S. .. The same reasoning applies to the asserted invasion of dece-
dent's privacy."' 09
Another possible constitutional issue concerning the disinterment
of human remains is that compulsory disinterment interferes with the
free exercise of religion where a religion prohibits disinterment.-l
But in light of Supreme Court decisions finding that religious cus-
toms must give way to secular goals of society,'-' disinterment, when
105. Id.
106. For a general statement of the constitutional right to privacy see Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (dissenting opinion); Warren & Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Rxv. 193 (1890).
107. Thompson v. Hickey, 8 Abb. N. Cas. 159, 167, 59 How. Pr. 434, 438
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1880).
108. E.g., Cordell v. Detective Publications, Inc., 419 F.2d 989 (6th Cir.
1969) (right of recovery for invasion of decreased's right of privacy, by publish-
ing a gruesome account of the murder of her daughter, was denied); Ravellette
v. Smigh, 300 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1962) (taking blood sample from a cadaver
was not an invasion of deceased's right to privacy).
109. Ravellette v. Smigh, 300 F.2d 854, 857 (7th Cir. 1962).
110. See generally Moving Cemeteries to Build Low-Income Housing, supra
note 99, at 104-06.
Ill. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) ("Sunday Closing Law"
was constitutional even though it caused hardship on Orthodox Jewish merchants
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
utilized for the public welfare, probably does not violate the first
amendment.
D. Solutions
The urban planner is faced with society's demand for more land
to be used for burials, while at the same time there is a desperate
need for open spaces in the cities' high density areas. This dilemma
is accentuated further by cultural and religious mores which impede
innovation. Despite these obstacles, there has been some innovative
solutions to the cemetery problem.
The first truly innovative plan in the western world for the dis-
posal of bodies was formulated in Basel, Switzerland in 1919.112 Called
H6rnli Gottesacker, the scheme was to select a large (125 acres) plot
of land on which all future burials for the city would be made. All
existing cemeteries were to be maintained until 1952, after which
time the municipal authorities could use the land for whatever pur-
poses they wished. All burials are now made at the city's expense, and
the grave is maintained free of charge for twenty years. At the end
of that time the family has to buy the grave and pay for mainten-
ance at a high price, or the grave will be used for further burials.
Basel is convinced that this plan will solve its cemetery problems for-
ever, and no additional land will ever be required?"13
A plan similar to Hdrnli Gottesacker was implemented in San
Francisco."14 Legislation was enacted in 1921 and 1923 to remove all
cemeteries from the city and prohibit future burials. Most of the
graves were moved to Colma, on the outskirts of San Francisco, and
this small town soon became a "cemetery city." Today, Colma has
500 living inhabitants, most of whom are connected with the funeral
business, and 90,000 dead inhabitants in graves."05
Another plan for the disposal of bodies is to encase them above
ground in large buildings. Accordingly, remains could be placed in
who must remain closed on Saturday); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890)
(a religious sect can be made illegal if its practice is harmful to society);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (illegalization of polygamy was
not an unconstitutional interference with the Mormons' right of religious
practice).
112. ASPO REPORT 22-23.
113. Id.




multi-story mausoleums which could hold as many as 20,000 bodies
in a fraction of the space used in a conventional cemetery. 1 6
Recognizing the wastefulness of urban land, planners have also
developed innovative ideas to make existing cemeteries a more useful
part of the urban environment.117 Consequently, some cities have
recently made efforts to convert cemeteries into useful open spaces.
In Cambridge, Massachusetts a cemetery fulfills a second function as
a botanical garden. 1 8 In California, Forest Lawn Memorial Parks
Cemetery, with no traditional monuments, contains copies of classic
sculpture, fountains, mosaics, the world's largest framed picture, and
has been an attractive setting for over 25,000 weddings."19
Probably one of the most promising cemetery schemes has been
the conversion of old neglected cemeteries into permanent green
space preserves. In a pilot plan, Pulaski, Tennessee with the aid of
a government grant, had remarkable success in converting a dilap-
idated graveyard into a beautiful park.120
Thus, despite a history of frustration for the planner who has dealt
with the problem of cemeteries in urban areas, there is some hope
for solutions. It may still be too early to detect a trend, but it seems
that the planner has acquiesced in the legal and ethical obstacles to
eminent domain and disinterment and has pursued a new course of
renovating existing cemeteries to make them a useful part of the
urban environment.
116. Wall Street Journal, Oct. 6, 1969, at 11, col. 1.
117. Fisher, Cemeteries Becoming Critical Factor in Land-Use Planning as
Urban Areas Grow, 27 J. HoUsING 527 (Nov. 1970). See HUD REPORT 18-20.
118. HUD RE:PORT 19-20. Fisher states: "j'Nlow that urban areas are growing
and the search for open space has become intense, the wastefulness of many urban
graveyards, which are often large, poorly maintained, and underused, is being
increasingly recognized." Fisher, supra note 117, at 527.
119. HUD REPORT 20.
120. Id. at 46-61.
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